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THE SPEECH OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OUTSIDE THE
WORKPLACE: TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK
Jeffrey A. Shooman∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment restrains the government from abridging
1
the freedom of speech. When the government functions as an employer, it has interests “that differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in gen2
eral.” The Supreme Court recognizes that when the government
acts as an employer, it must be given some leeway to limit speech for
3
it to operate efficiently and effectively. On the other hand, governmental employ does not allow the government’s interest as an employer to commandeer the First Amendment analysis, for “[u]nconstrained discussion concerning the manner in which the government
performs its duties is an essential element of the public discourse
4
necessary to informed self-government.” The courts have struggled
with this tension, but a relatively clear set of rules has emerged in the
doctrine.
Speech that is a matter of public concern, occurs outside of
work, and does not interfere with the government’s ability to function
5
is generally entitled to protection. Likewise, speech that relates to a
matter of public concern, occurs at work, and does not impair the
government’s ability to function is also generally entitled to protec6
tion. Speech that is purely personal to the employee in question and
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1
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
3
See id.
4
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 161 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5
See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73, 574.
6
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–85, 388 (1987).
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that occurs at work is generally not entitled to protection. This
Comment primarily addresses a fourth category of speech: speech
that occurs outside the workplace, is wholly unrelated to work, and is
not a matter of “public concern,” as the courts have defined the term.
8
A handful of cases have addressed this issue. In evaluating
whether speech is entitled to protection under the First Amendment,
courts have generally applied the traditional framework set forth by
9
the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education and Connick v.
10
Myers. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Pickering requires courts to
balance the interests of public employees, as citizens, “in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per11
forms through its employees.” Connick, which latched onto Pickering’s public concern language, erected a threshold requirement
that an employee must meet to even reach balancing under Pickering:
12
the employee’s speech must touch upon a matter of public concern.
A problem with applying Connick’s holding to speech outside the
workplace is that while the threshold requirement effectively disposes
of cases involving speech that should not receive protection, it also
prevents people from obtaining First Amendment protection for
speech deserving of such protection. That Connick’s threshold requirement is not elastic enough is demonstrated in “at the workplace” cases where courts have stretched the meaning of public con13
cern far beyond Connick’s conception of the term. The problem
with Connick is not necessarily its result; rather, the problem is that its
14
doctrinal design ignores a large universe of cases. Some courts have
recognized the illogic of applying the Connick analysis in the context
of employee speech that occurs outside of work, while other courts

7

See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
See Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77
(2004); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2002); Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1994);
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992
(4th Cir. 1985).
9
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
10
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
11
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
12
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–48.
13
See, e.g., Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050–52 (6th Cir.
2001) (holding that a schoolteacher’s speech regarding the beneficial environmental
effects of industrial hemp constituted a matter of public concern).
14
See infra Part III.
8
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have simply avoided the Connick analysis entirely. Courts that have
attempted to apply Connick to speech that occurred outside the workplace have simply contorted Connick to the point where it has been
rendered meaningless.
This Comment explains why current Supreme Court jurisprudence has proven inadequate in dealing with employee speech that
occurs outside the workplace. Part II explains the law that governs
public employee speech under the First Amendment. Part III addresses how the lower courts have dealt with speech that does not relate to work and occurs away from the workplace. Part III also recounts the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the
subject. Part IV analyzes the state of the law and explains why the
Court’s treatment of the issue begs for a fresh doctrinal approach.
Part V advocates the formulation of a new test for speech that occurs
outside the workplace. Specifically, Part V proposes the abandonment of Connick’s public concern requirement for all cases in which
the speech occurs outside the workplace. For matters that are workrelated, the employer should have to justify adverse employment decisions against employees under Pickering. For matters wholly unrelated to work, the speech should be presumptively protected unless
the government employer shows actual harm or the specter of imminent harm to the workplace.

15

Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543
U.S. 77 (2004) (holding that public concern is automatically satisfied when the
speech is not about work, occurs outside of work, and is directed towards the general
public); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 186 (2d Cir. 2003) (avoiding the public
concern question by assuming without deciding that the threshold was fulfilled after
recognizing that many courts have questioned whether the “test is appropriate in
cases like the present one”); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 2002) (assuming without deciding that the public concern test was met); Eberhardt v.
O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the public concern test is
designed to distinguish personal employee grievances rather than fix the outer limits
of what the First Amendment protects); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564
(10th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he public concern test does not apply when public employee
nonverbal protected expression does not occur at work and is not about work.”);
Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985) (observing that the public concern test should be confined to cases that involve employee speech that is purely personal to the employee, such as grievances). The Author would like to note that
shortly before publication, the Second Circuit issued its decision in Locurto v.
Giuliani. Nos. 04-6480-cv(L), 04-6498-cv(CON), 04-6499-cv(CON), 2006 WL 1130906
(2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2006). As relevant to this Comment, Locurto held that “the public
concern test does not apply neatly as a threshold test for expression unrelated to Government employment.” Id. at *12. Only insofar as Locurto so held, the Author
agrees. See infra Parts IV and V.
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II. BACKGROUND
Public employees enjoy at least some First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court first recognized this principle in Keyishian
16
17
v. Board of Regents, which repudiated a long line of cases that clung
hard and fast to Justice Holmes’s famous admonition that a policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
18
constitutional right to be a policeman.” In Keyishian, the Court held
unconstitutional New York statutes that barred public employment to
19
members of subversive organizations. The Court’s decision in Keyishian was the culmination of cases in the 1950’s and 60’s that attacked
state practices of forcing public employees to swear oaths of loyalty
20
and to reveal their political associations. In Wiemann v. Updegraff,
the Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma state law that required
all state officers and employees to swear loyalty oaths and to reveal
21
22
their associational activities.
Similarly, in Shelton v. Tucker, the
Court held it impermissible to condition schoolteachers’ employment
on the requirement that they file affidavits listing the names and addresses of any group or organization they had belonged to in the pre23
vious five years. Finally, in Keyishian, the Court quoted approvingly
24
the language of Sherbert v. Verner: “‘It is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the
25
denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.’” In
1968, the Court decided Pickering, which articulated the current standard for evaluating whether or not employee speech is protected by
the First Amendment.

16

385 U.S. 589 (1967).
See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 491–95 (1952) (holding constitutional a New York law that punished school teachers who spoke seditious words or
engaged in seditious acts); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720–24 (1951)
(holding constitutional a California law requiring, inter alia, public employees to
swear they neither had not been and were not members of the communist party);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94–104 (1947) (holding constitutional
the Hatch Act, a federal law regulating the political activities of federal employees);
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 398–99 (1930) (upholding against constitutional challenge the Federal Corrupt Practices Act).
18
McAullife v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
19
Keyishian, 385 U.S. 589, 597–610.
20
344 U.S. 183 (1952).
21
Id. at 185.
22
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
23
Id. at 487–90.
24
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
25
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (quoting Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 404).
17
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In February of 1961, the Board of Education of Township High
School District 205 in Will County, Illinois, sought approval by the
voters of a bond referendum of $4,875,000, seeking to build two new
26
27
schools. The voters rejected the proposal. In December of the
same year, the Board offered another proposal, this time seeking to
28
raise $5,500,000 for the construction of two new schools. The sec29
ond proposal passed. Almost three years later, in 1964, the Board
30
proposed a tax increase that the citizens voted down. Later that
year, the tax increase was again submitted to the voters who, once
31
again, defeated it. Via the local newspaper, the local teachers organization had urged voters to approve the tax hike, arguing that defeating it would decrease the quality of education provided by the
32
schools. Two days before the second vote, the paper published a letter from the superintendent of schools urging the voters to approve
33
the increase.
In response to the campaign for the tax increase, Marvin
Pickering, a schoolteacher in the district, wrote a letter expressing
34
disagreement with the way the Board handled the 1961 bond issue.
Pickering also took issue with the Board’s allocation of financial re35
sources as between its educational and athletic programs. Finally,
Pickering charged the superintendent “with attempting to prevent
teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed
36
bond issue.”
37
Pickering was fired for writing the letter. At the Board hearing,
the Board alleged that Pickering’s letter contained numerous falsities and that the letter’s publication unjustifiably harmed the integrity
38
of the Board and the administration. Pickering’s letter, the Board
argued, “would tend to foment controversy, conflict, and dissension
among teachers, administrators, the Board of Education, and the

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566–67.
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residents of the district.” Pickering brought a lawsuit in the state
40
circuit court, which upheld his dismissal. Over the dissent of two
41
justices, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the United States Supreme
42
Court reversed.
The Court began its opinion by identifying the
competing interests in these cases: “the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
43
public services it performs through its employees.” The Court, first
evaluating the truthful aspects of Pickering’s letter, observed that this
was not a case in which Pickering’s letter would have an adverse effect
on his employment relationships with either the Board or the super44
intendent. The Court thus rejected the Board’s position that truthful statements can warrant dismissal due to their inherently critical
45
46
nature. Turning to Pickering’s false statements, the Court held
that there was simply no evidence showing that the letter impeded
Pickering’s performance of his duties or interfered with the opera47
tion of the schools.
The Court concluded, “the interest of the
school administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in lim48
iting a similar contribution by any member of the general public.”
Fifteen years later, the Court revisited the employee speech issue
in Connick v. Myers. Connick erected a threshold requirement that
public employees must meet to even reach the Pickering balancing
49
test. Sheila Myers was an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans.
50
Harry Connick was the District Attorney of New Orleans. In October of 1980, Connick told Myers that she would be transferred to an51
other division of criminal court. Although Myers strongly objected
52
53
to the transfer, Connick urged her to accept the reassignment.

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 568.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570.
Id.
Id. at 570–73.
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 573.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Myers prepared a questionnaire designed to elicit the views of her fellow workers on matters regarding, among other things, office transfer
54
policy and morale. Myers distributed the questionnaire to fifteen
55
assistant district attorneys. One of her supervisors learned that she
was distributing the survey and informed Connick that “Myers was
56
creating a ‘mini-insurrection’ within the office.” Connick then ter57
minated Myers for failing to accept the transfer. He also told Myers
that he considered the distribution of the questionnaire an act of in58
subordination.
Myers filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging she was
wrongfully terminated because the First Amendment protected the
59
speech in which she had engaged.
She prevailed in the district
60
court, which ordered her reinstatement and awarded her damages.
61
Connick appealed and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In an opinion by
Justice White, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court
62
of appeals.
The Court concluded that Pickering and its progeny stood for the
proposition that courts should not examine the government’s reasons
for discharging an employee when the employee’s speech does not
63
touch upon a matter of public concern. Indeed, “[w]hen employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community,” the government
should essentially wield its power to do all that is necessary to effi64
ciently run its offices without judicial oversight. Courts are not appropriate forums to address personnel decisions made by public
65
agencies when they involve matters of personal interest. To determine whether an employee’s speech touches upon a matter of public
concern, courts must look to the “content, form, and context of a
66
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” The Court found

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 141.
Id.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141–42.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 142.
Id. at 142–54.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 147–48.
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67

that Myers’s questionnaire, save one exception, did not touch upon
68
matters of public concern. Indeed, Myers’s questions were “mere
extensions of [her] dispute over her transfer to another section of
69
the criminal court.”
They were not matters of public concern
because they did not seek to inform the public about the District At70
torney’s Office. The Court did not engage in Pickering balancing
because Myers’s statements did not meet the public concern thresh71
old.
Justice Brennan filed a dissent. First, Justice Brennan argued
that the manner and context of the employee’s statement is not rele72
vant to the public concern analysis. The manner and context is
relevant in the second part of Pickering’s analysis—whether or not the
speech harms the employer’s interests—but whether an employee
chooses to express his grievance in private or in public should be ir73
relevant in the public concern calculus.
Next, Justice Brennan
strenuously argued that the First Amendment vigilantly protects “the
dissemination of information on the basis of which members of our
74
society may make reasoned decisions about the government.” As
such, it is crucial that statements critical of public officials fall within
75
the ambit of the First Amendment’s protection. Justice Brennan
chided the majority for adopting a narrow conception of public concern, arguing the majority’s fear that every remark by a public employee would “‘plant the seed of a constitutional case’” was un76
founded.
By adopting such a narrow conception, the majority
wrested from the people the determination of whether employee
77
speech had utility and gave the choice to judges. Justice Brennan
argued that it was more consistent with the First Amendment to
evaluate employee speech by asking whether or not the speech inter-

67

Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. The Court found that Myers’s question whether any
of the assistant district attorneys “ever [felt] pressured to work in political campaigns
on behalf of office supported candidates” involved a matter of public concern. Id.
The Court concluded nonetheless, under the rationale of Pickering, that Connick was
justified in discharging Myers. See id. at 154.
68
Id. at 148.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154
72
Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 161 (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966)).
75
Id. at 162.
76
Id. at 164 (quoting the majority opinion at 149).
77
Connick, 461 U.S. at 165 (Brennan J., dissenting).
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fered with the “performance of governmental functions and in pre78
serving employee discipline and harmony.”
79
A few years later, in Rankin v. McPherson, the Court had an opportunity to address employee speech that took place at work, but was
completely unrelated to work. Ardith McPherson was a deputy con80
stable in the office of the Constable of Harris County, Texas. On
March 30, 1981, McPherson and some of her fellow co-workers heard
on the radio that there had been an assassination attempt on Presi81
dent Reagan’s life. McPherson subsequently engaged in a conversation with Lawrence Jackson, her boyfriend, where she said, in perti82
nent part: “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.” A coworker overheard McPherson’s remark and reported it to Constable
83
Walter Rankin. McPherson confessed to making the statement, but
84
said that she “didn’t mean anything by it.” Rankin subsequently
85
fired McPherson.
McPherson filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that Rankin, in terminating McPherson’s employment, had violated
86
her constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judg87
ment to Rankin, holding that McPherson’s speech was unprotected.
88
The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for trial. On remand, the
district court ruled that the statements were unprotected, and the
court of appeals again reversed, holding that McPherson’s statement
89
touched upon a matter of public concern. The appellate court then
engaged in balancing under Pickering, concluding that because
McPherson’s duties were ministerial in nature and “‘her potential for
undermining the office’s mission so trivial,’” the government’s interest in maintaining an efficient workplace did not outweigh McPher90
son’s interest in her speech.

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id.
483 U.S. 378 (1987).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 381.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 382.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
Id. (quoting McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1239 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court turned to the threshold test set forth in Connick: whether
92
McPherson’s speech touched upon a matter of public concern. The
Court held that McPherson’s statement “plainly dealt with a matter of
93
public concern.”
The Court considered the context in which
McPherson made the statement, during the course of a conversation
94
discussing the President’s policies.
The Court concluded that
95
McPherson’s statement was not a threat to kill the President, and
that the inappropriateness of McPherson’s statement was irrelevant to
96
the public concern analysis. The Court quoted New York Times v.
97
Sullivan, observing that public debate sometimes includes sharp,
98
Turning to balancing under
caustic attacks on public officials.
Pickering, the Court held that Rankin had failed to show that the employer’s interest in maintaining an efficient workplace outweighed
99
McPherson’s right to free speech. The Court concluded that Rankin did not inquire as to whether McPherson’s statement disrupted
100
the work of the office.
Furthermore, because she made her statement in private, no evidence existed that McPherson disparaged the
101
office of the constable. McPherson’s statement was neither related
to the functioning of the office nor to her ability to perform her
102
work.
Justice Marshall concluded by noting the importance of considering the duties and responsibilities of the employee when the State
argues that it is necessary to discharge an employee because the employee’s speech undermines the functioning of a government of103
fice. Justice Marshall determined that where the employee is not a
91

Rankin, 483 U.S. at 383.
Id. at 384.
93
Id. at 386.
94
Id. at 386. Indeed, McPherson testified that before she uttered “I hope they
get him,” Jackson was speaking about the President’s policies on welfare, Medicaid,
and food stamps. Id. at 381.
95
Under federal statutes, a threat to kill the President is unprotected speech. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 871(a), 2385 (2000).
96
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387.
97
376 U.S. 254 (1964)
98
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387 (“‘Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.’”) (ellipses in original)
(quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
99
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 389.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 390–92.
92
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policy maker or does not serve in a public capacity, “the danger to
the agency’s successful functioning from that employee’s private
104
Accordingly, Justice Marshall found that
speech is minimal.”
McPherson’s duties were purely clerical and, thus, she was not in105
volved with any law enforcement function of the constable’s office.
Consequently, the office’s interest in maintaining an efficient work106
place did not outweigh McPherson’s First Amendment rights.
107
In Justice Powell’s
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion.
view, it was unnecessary for the Court to engage in the analysis required by Connick and Pickering because it will only be the “unusual
case” where the employer will have such an overriding interest in
maintaining an efficient workplace that it will be justified in punishing an employee for making “a single, offhand comment directed to
108
only one other worker . . . .”
Notwithstanding, Justice Powell
agreed with the Court’s Connick and Pickering analysis of McPherson’s
109
speech.
110
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that McPherson’s statement
111
clearly did not touch upon a matter of public concern.
Justice
Scalia rejected the majority’s attempt to contextualize McPherson’s
statement and argued that McPherson’s criticisms of President
Reagan’s policies merely fashioned her motives for uttering her re112
mark, rather than actually forming the basis of its content. Justice
Scalia concluded that McPherson’s statement was very near the category of speech that was unprotected. For support, Justice Scalia cited
113
cases that dealt with fighting words and advocacy of force or vio114
lence, arguing that such speech could not possibly fall within the
115
ambit of the First Amendment’s protection. Justice Scalia also took
issue with the majority’s contention that the government’s interest in
maintaining a successfully functioning workplace is diminished when

104

Id. at 390–91.
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 392–94 (Powell, J., concurring).
108
Id. at 393.
109
Id.
110
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 394–401 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111
Id. at 396.
112
Id. at 396–97.
113
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that fighting
words are unprotected by the First Amendment).
114
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (holding that incitement of
violence is unprotected by the First Amendment).
115
Rankin, 483 U.S. at 397–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105
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the speech of a low-level, non-policymaking employee is at issue.
Employees such as McPherson, Justice Scalia argued, “can hurt working relationships and undermine public confidence in an organiza117
tion every bit as much as policymaking employees.”
Justice Scalia
gave a number of examples of the type of conduct that would be protected under the majority’s ruling, such as non-policymaking employees of the EEOC being permitted to make remarks approving of
racial discrimination on the job, or employees of the Selective Service
118
System urging refusal to comply with the draft laws.
The Court expounded upon Connick’s definition of public concern in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (National
119
Treasury). The case involved a challenge to a 1989 federal law that
prohibited federal employees from accepting compensation for delivering speeches or writing articles, even if those speeches or articles
120
were unrelated to the employee’s employment.
Both the district
court and the court of appeals invalidated the law insofar as it applied
121
The Supreme Court affirmed in
to Executive Branch employees.
122
part and reversed in part. The Court’s decision in National Treasury
is relevant to this Comment in two key respects: its discussion of Connick and Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.
The Court applied Connick because the case involved a burden
on employee speech and the Court held that the speech at issue
123
touched upon matters of public concern.
The speech did not involve “employee comment on matters related to personal status in the
124
The Court held that the speech was addressed to a
workplace.”
public audience, was made outside the workplace, and was largely un125
related to the plaintiffs’ government employment. Accordingly, the
Court applied Pickering.

116

Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 400.
118
Id. at 400–01.
119
513 U.S. 454 (1995).
120
Id. at 457.
121
Id. at 462–63.
122
Id. at 480. Specifically, the Court upheld the enjoinment of the statute insofar
as it applied to the specific plaintiffs who brought the suit, but the Court reversed the
judgment insofar as it granted relief to parties who were not before the court. Id.
123
Id. at 466. The speech that the plaintiffs engaged in comprised of, inter alia, a
Postal Service employee giving speeches on the Quaker religion, a tax examiner writing articles about the environment, and a scientist at the FDA who wrote articles reviewing dance performances. Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 461–62.
124
Id. at 466.
125
Id.
117
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Justice O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part.
While Justice O’Connor focused primarily on the government’s in127
terests in adopting the honoraria ban and the remedy adopted by
128
the Court, the opinion also briefly analyzed why the speech in the
129
case did not implicate Connick’s public concern threshold question.
Justice O’Connor wrote that the plaintiffs challenged the law as it applied to speech that occurred outside the workplace and was unrelated to the plaintiffs’ government employment—“speech that by
definition does not relate to internal office affairs or the employee’s
130
status as an employee.”
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS WRESTLE WITH CONNICK
The lower courts have had difficulty applying Connick to fact patterns involving employee conduct that occurred outside the work131
place and was unrelated to work. In Berger v. Battaglia, the Fourth
Circuit explained that Connick should be read narrowly and apply
only to fact patterns like the one involved in Connick itself. The court
132
in Flanagan v. Munger held that Connick does not apply at all in cases
that involve employee speech that occurs outside the workplace and
is unrelated to the employee’s government employment. Finally, in
133
134
Roe v. City of San Diego, recently overturned by the Supreme Court,
the Ninth Circuit conducted a full blown analysis from Connick to National Treasury, synthesizing the case law to conclude that the em135
ployee speech at issue touched upon a matter of public concern.
A. Connick Should Be Read Narrowly
Berger v. Battaglia, decided soon after Connick, involved Robert M.
136
Berger, a police officer with the Baltimore Police Department.
During his off-duty hours, Berger performed a musical and singing
act, not affiliated with his position as a police officer or the department, a part of which contained an impersonation of the singer Al
126

Id. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 480–85.
128
Id. at 485–89.
129
Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
130
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
131
779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
132
890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).
133
356 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
134
543 U.S. 77 (2004).
135
Roe, 356 F.3d at 1115–22.
136
Berger, 779 F.2d at 993.
127
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Jolson. To impersonate Jolson, Berger wore blackface makeup and
138
Berger sought to entertain people; at no point did
a black wig.
he make derogatory or inflammatory remarks or seek confronta139
tion. Eventually, Berger became well known for his act and entered
140
into an agreement with the Baltimore Hilton Hotel to perform.
The Hilton advertised Berger’s performance in the local newspaper
141
with a picture of Berger in blackface. The advertisement offended
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(“NAACP”), which eventually succeeded in getting a show cancelled
due to rumors that its members would storm the stage if Berger per142
formed his act in blackface.
After the cancellation of the show, the police department re143
ceived complaints from black citizens and from the NAACP.
The
department then ordered Berger, who was then on light-duty status,
144
to cease all public performances of his act. When Berger returned
to full duty status, his commanding officer ordered him not to wear
145
blackface in public. But Berger continued to perform in blackface,
146
even after he was ordered not to, without incident or complaint.
He sought permission from the department to receive pay for his per147
formances and his request was denied.
Berger subsequently brought suit in federal district court, alleg148
ing that the department had violated his right to free speech. The
district court entered judgment in favor of the department despite
finding that Berger’s speech touched upon a matter of public con149
cern. The court struck the balance under Pickering in favor of the
department because the department had an overpowering interest in
maintaining good relations with Baltimore’s black community and

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Berger, 779 F.2d at 994–95.
Id. at 995.
Id.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Berger, 779 F.2d at 996.
Id.
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150

averting future disruptions. Berger appealed, and the Court of Ap151
peals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.
The Fourth Circuit held that the public concern test is more
properly suited to address a category of speech that is not protected
152
than to fix the First Amendment’s outer limits of protection.
Accordingly, the speech that is not entitled to protection is speech that
is of personal concern to the employee, such as a personnel griev153
ance. The appropriate inquiry, the court held, is whether the public would be concerned with the expression or whether the employee
speech is merely “a private matter between employer and em154
ployee.”
Applying this test, the court held that Berger’s performances were of concern to the community and they were obviously of
155
public interest because the public willingly paid to see him perform.
Moreover, the court held that the balance under Pickering should be
struck in favor of Berger and remanded the case to the district court
156
for further proceedings.
B. Connick Does Not Apply at All
Flanagan v. Munger concerned three police officers in the Colorado Springs Police Department, along with an investor named Richard Paul, who together formed a corporation to open and operate a
157
video rental store.
Paul procured 2500 used video tapes for the
158
The films were available
company, 100 of which were adult films.
only to persons twenty-one and older, and only the film titles were
159
visible from the shelf. James Munger, the chief of police, received
an anonymous letter alleging that certain police officers “were co160
owners of a Porno Video business.” Munger conducted an investigation and concluded that the officers were violating or had violated
161
the department’s regulation concerning off-duty employment.
Munger subsequently asked the officers to remove the adult films

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id.
Id. at 993, 1003.
Id. at 998.
Id.
Berger, 779 F.2d at 999 (internal quotations marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 999–1003.
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1560 (10th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
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from their inventory.
He also told the officers that they would re163
ceive a reprimand for violating departmental regulations. The offi164
cers removed the adult films from the store’s shelves.
Thereafter, a local reporter contacted one of the officers, asking
him to verify information that the officers ran a video store that
rented adult films and that the officers were reprimanded for their
165
activities.
After the conversation, the officers arranged a meeting
166
with Chief Munger. Munger then spoke to the local media and an167
nounced the imposition of written reprimands against the officers.
The officers filed suit in federal district court, alleging that, inter alia,
168
their First Amendment rights had been violated. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all causes
169
of action. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in
170
part and reversed in part.
Analyzing the officers’ First Amendment claim, the court first
noted that the fact pattern was conceptually different from the archetypal Pickering/Connick fact patterns because the conduct at issue—the
officers’ stocking their video store with adult films—occurred off the
171
job and was unrelated to the officers’ government employment.
The court held that Connick did not apply to the case because it involved nonverbal protected expression that neither occurred at work
172
nor was about work.
The court first wrestled with the notion that
placing sexually explicit videos for rent in a video store could somehow qualify as a matter of public concern; indeed, the court noted, it
173
is difficult to see how it possibly could. Next, the court noted that
when a statement is made at or about work, the public concern test
makes sense because the distinction to be made is whether the statement takes on some significance outside the workplace or whether
174
the statement is purely personal to the employee’s employment.
Where the facts involve speech that is non-work related and occurred
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id.
Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1561.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1561.
Id. at 1572.
Id. at 1562.
Id.
Id. at 1563.
Id. at 1564.
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outside the workplace, the court distinguished, “the purpose behind
175
The court obusing the public concern test is simply irrelevant.”
served that the purpose of Connick, as Connick itself observed, was to
weed out lawsuits concerning employee speech where the employee
176
was speaking on matters of purely personal interest.
Accordingly, the court held that the public concern test did not
177
apply.
Instead, the court developed an alternative test that it said
178
could fulfill the same function as the public concern test. The test
179
is simply whether the speech itself involves protected expression. If
it does, then courts should balance, pursuant to Pickering, the employee’s right against the employer’s right to run its operation effi180
ciently.
C. A Full Blown Analysis Under Connick and National Treasury
John Roe, the plaintiff in Roe v. City of San Diego, sold sexually
explicit videos of himself on eBay while serving as a police officer in
181
182
San Diego.
Roe wore a generic police uniform in the videos.
Roe’s supervisor became aware of Roe’s activities and discovered certain items offered for sale by Roe, including a uniform formerly used
183
by the San Diego Police Department.
The department began an
184
investigation into Roe’s activities, purchasing items from him.
At
no time did Roe identify himself by name or as a San Diego Police of185
Eventually, one of Roe’s supervisors interviewed Roe about
ficer.
his sale of videos and other items on eBay and Roe admitted to the
186
conduct.
The department concluded that Roe had violated three
department policies and ordered Roe to stop selling or distributing
187
sexually explicit materials over the Internet.

175

Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564.
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 1565.
181
Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543
U.S. 77 (2004).
182
Id. at 1110.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 1110–11.
186
Id. at 1111.
187
Roe, 356 F.3d at 1111.
176
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Roe subsequently removed the items he had listed for sale, but
188
he did not change his seller’s profile on eBay. His profile described
two sexually explicit videos he had produced, the prices of the two
189
videos, and the price he charged to make custom videos. Roe was
then charged with violating a fourth departmental policy and disci190
The department terminated
plinary action was recommended.
191
Roe’s employment. Roe filed suit in federal district court, alleging
that he was terminated in violation of his First Amendment right to
192
The district court dismissed Roe’s complaint
freedom of speech.
193
194
for failure to state a claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed.
The court first noted the purpose of the public concern test is
“to avoid the constitutionalization of common workplace grievances
195
between public employers and employees.” The court understood
196
NoneConnick not to give a precise definition of public concern.
theless, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holding in Connick that the issue in the Connick plaintiff’s questionnaire—
whether employees were pressured to work on political campaigns—
197
touched upon a matter of public concern. The court proceeded to
observe that the typical public concern case involves employee criticism of an employer’s policy, specific actions, or supervisory person198
nel. Additionally, the panel noted its circuit’s penchant for reading
public concern broadly when internal disputes or power struggles
199
The panel, however, distinguished the case bewere not at issue.
fore the court because the employee conduct occurred outside the
200
workplace.
Next, the court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Na201
tional Treasury. The court relied heavily on National Treasury’s brief
observations that none of the speech in that case was related to the
employee’s employment and the speech occurred outside the work-

188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roe, 356 F.3d at 1111.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1115 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)).
Id.
Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148).
Id. at 1116 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Roe, 356 F.3d at 1117 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
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202

place. Furthermore, the court then quoted approvingly the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in Berger for the proposition that speech that is not
purely personal to the employee is at least entitled to qualified pro203
204
tection. Citing Berger and a Ninth Circuit case that adopted Berger
for support, the court explained that public concern as set forth in
Connick served a narrow purpose: “to preempt a narrow category of
claims involving speech related to a public employee’s status in the
205
workplace.”
Accordingly, the court held that when speech is not
about the employer or employment, is directed to the general public,
and occurs away from the workplace, the speech touches upon a mat206
ter of public concern.
D. Roe Is Overruled
Deciding the case solely on the briefs, the Supreme Court re207
versed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Roe.
The Court termed the
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on National Treasury as “seriously mis208
placed.” The Court noted that Roe took steps to link his videos and
the other items he sold on eBay to the department in a way that
209
harmed the department.
The Court observed that San Diego had
conceded throughout the litigation that Roe’s activities were unre210
The Court, however, wrote that San
lated to his employment.
Diego had consistently maintained that Roe’s speech was “detrimental” to the police department and “harmful to the proper functioning
211
of the police force.” Accordingly, the Court held that Roe was controlled by Connick and Pickering, rather than by National Treasury.
212
The Court next applied Connick. The Court held that “public
concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that
is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public
213
at the time of publication.”
Applying this test of public concern,

202

Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,
466 (1995)).
203
Id. at 1119 (quoting Berger, 779 F.2d at 998).
204
Id. (citing Berger, 779 F.2d at 998; Roe v. City & County of San Francisco, 109
F.3d 578, 585 (9th Cir. 1997)).
205
Roe, 356 F.3d at 1119.
206
Id. at 1119–20.
207
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam).
208
Id. at 81.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 83–84.
213
Roe, 543 U.S. at 83–84 (emphasis added).
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the Court concluded that Roe’s speech did not qualify. The Court
pointed to the dissent in Connick to explain why Roe’s speech failed
215
The dissenters in Connick conto make this even “a close case.”
cluded that the activities of Myers, the plaintiff in Connick, touched
upon a matter of public concern because they informed the public
about how a certain elected official was discharging his duties; but
Roe’s activities “did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of
216
the [police department’s] functioning or operation.”
Nor was
Roe’s expression akin to that uttered in Rankin, where the speech was
217
related to political news.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Speech In, Speech Out
The ultimate question to be answered in public employee
speech cases is whether the speech is entitled to the full panoply of
First Amendment protections. Because the Pickering balancing test is
218
fact sensitive, however, there is no general principle applicable to
the speech in every case. The issue is whether the speech is at least
entitled to qualified protection. Qualified protection means that the
employer would have to show, in order to permissibly limit the
speech, that the employee’s speech interfered with the efficiency of
219
the operations, as discussed in Pickering.
The Court in Connick
made clear that it did not want to constitutionalize workplace per220
sonnel disputes and grievances. But what about non-workplace disputes that are non-work-related? The question arises, do we want to
offer qualified protection to such speech, and if so, why?
Autonomy is one of the primary justifications underlying free221
dom of speech and the literature on the autonomy justification for
222
free speech is quite extensive. The Kantian view of autonomy pos-

214

Id. at 84.
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
219
See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
220
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
221
Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 989 (2003).
222
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875
(1994); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust,
215
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ited that individuals are to be treated as ends unto themselves, “with a
right to the greatest liberty compatible with the like liberties of all
223
others.” A person’s action is limited insofar as it impinges on oth224
ers. Charles Fried argued that people are free to arrange their lives
225
within their own sphere of liberty. Allowing the speech in the foregoing cases allows people to be autonomous and have a certain degree of control in running their lives.
Such autonomy should not be merely circumscribed to speech
that is a matter of public concern. Under the Kantian view of autonomy, speech is valuable in and of itself because individuals are ends
unto themselves, and protecting one person’s political speech while
not protecting another’s sexually explicit speech would run counter
226
to this assumption. In curbing the free speech rights of employees
away from the workplace, the employee is converted into essentially
an arm of the State and, in a way, ceases to be her own person. People are not entirely measured by what they do; they are also measured
by who they are. Public concern, in many cases, ceases to allow public employees to be who they are, and in so doing, undermines their
autonomy as individuals. The speech in Roe, Berger, and Flanagan is
valuable not because of any tangible benefit it adds to society, but because it allows the individual to function freely. Of course, the
227
speech may ultimately be unprotected when Pickering is applied, but
the autonomy rationale at least supports providing speech qualified
protection against government censorship.
B. Roe’s Red Herring; Connick’s Havoc
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roe did not overrule the foregoing lower court cases (except Roe itself) that have interpreted Connick as applying, if at all, very narrowly in out-of-the-workplace cases
228
related to employment.
Accordingly, it will be necessary to take

64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1171 (1993); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
223
Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1959) (1785);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (John Ladd trans., BobbsMerrill Co., 1965) (1797)).
224
Fried, supra note 223, at 233.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
228
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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Connick on its own terms, and reconcile those cases with Connick to
see whether or not those cases read it correctly.
i.

Roe Did Not So Much Address Public Concern as
Engage in a Pickering Analysis

In Roe, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on National Treasury in its
229
decision. In National Treasury, the Supreme Court held that public
concern was satisfied because the speech at issue occurred outside
230
the workplace and was unrelated to the employees’ employment.
The Court in National Treasury essentially ascribed the same meaning
to Connick as did the Fourth Circuit in Berger, and to a lesser extent,
231
the Tenth Circuit in Flanagan.
Coupled with Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence, National Treasury stands for the proposition that Connick
excised from constitutional protection a very narrow category of
232
speech.
The Supreme Court in Roe, however, rejected the comparison to
National Treasury by holding that the San Diego Police Department
233
(“SDPD”) had been injured by Roe’s activities. This analysis, however, does not address public concern so much as it addresses the
other side of the constitutional equation: the balancing inquiry under
Pickering. The Court wrote of the “detriment[]” to the SDPD and the
234
“harm[]” to the police force. This statement mirrors the language
that typically guides the Pickering analysis, which requires the employer to show that the employee’s speech would harm the efficiency
235
of its operations. Instead, the National Treasury Court was conduct236
ing a public concern analysis. When the Court in Roe wrote that the
237
case “falls outside the protection afforded in [National Treasury],” it
confused the role of National Treasury in the Court’s employee free
speech jurisprudence. National Treasury does not offer “protection”
as much as it merely applies Connick—and it does so fairly narrowly at
229

Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77
(2004).
230
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995).
231
See id. at 466; see Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1563 (10th Cir. 1989)
(“[T]he public concern test was not intended to apply to situations of this type.”);
Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998-99 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that speech outside
the workplace and unrelated to work is subject to qualified protection under Connick).
232
Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466.
233
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80–82 (2004) (per curiam).
234
Id. at 81.
235
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
236
Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466.
237
Roe, 543 U.S. at 82.
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238

that. Accordingly, the Court chose to apply Connick instead of Na239
tional Treasury. This is, of course, an improper choice because the
240
two cases are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the National Treasury
court applied Connick straightforwardly for the proposition that certain speech falls within Connick’s definition of public concern when it
241
occurs outside the workplace and is unrelated to work.
The principle that emerges from the Court’s discussion of National Treasury is that National Treasury will be disregarded where there
242
is harm to the employer. The logical endpoint of this principle is
that courts can simply bypass the public concern analysis where there
has been a showing of discrete harm to the employer and move right
to Pickering. It is possible that, in Roe, the Supreme Court found the
243
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on National Treasury “seriously misplaced”
because such reliance compelled the conclusion that Roe’s activities
were, in fact, matters of public concern under National Treasury.
Thus, the correct reading of Roe is that the Court ascribed such
low value to Roe’s speech—his engaging in sexually explicit conduct
on film—that the Court simply chose not to protect it. The case is an
outlier in the public concern cases and it should not be read as a vehicle by which to explicate Connick. To be sure, Roe certainly elaborates on the definitional aspect of Connick insofar as it defines the
244
contours of public concern.
But by implicitly applying Pickering,
and by merely rejecting National Treasury’s application in the instant
case, Roe does not answer the question of how Connick should generally be applied to cases that involve speech made outside the workplace, unrelated to employment. Instead, Roe left National Treasury’s
discussion of public concern standing, and in doing so, left open the
possibility that speech directed at a public audience, made outside
the workplace, and unrelated to the employee’s government employment, fulfills Connick’s conception of public concern.
ii.

Connick: Why Public Concern in Outside-the-Workplace
Cases is a Doctrinal Failure

Connick is a doctrinal failure. Connick’s public concern doctrine
exempts so much speech from protection that it fails to protect even
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

See Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466.
Roe, 543 U.S. at 83–84.
See Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466.
Id.
Roe, 543 U.S. at 83–84.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 83–84.
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the most innocuous employee speech that occurs off campus and is
unrelated to work.
It is clear that Connick did not contemplate cases where the employee’s speech was non-work related and occurred outside the
245
workplace.
As Professor Lee points out, Connick made clear that
grievances over personnel matters did not constitute matters of pub246
lic concern. However, Professor Lee also points out that the Court
in Rankin fit, within the Connick framework, speech that most assur247
edly was not a matter of public concern. Connick purports to tell us
that speech that is a matter of public concern will be protected by
248
This is
showing us what speech is not a matter of public concern.
the doctrinal conundrum borne by Connick, and it is hardly confined
249
to cases that involve speech that occurs outside the workplace.
Connick could have confined its holding to personnel or intra-office
disputes or power struggles. Instead, it painted with a broad brush,
requiring that the speech touch upon a matter of public concern to
250
even reach balancing under the Pickering test. The question arises,
though, whether it is legitimate to read Connick as suggesting that all
speech other than internal personnel disputes or employee grievances
constitute matters of public concern. Put another way, should Con251
nick be read as the lower court cases suggest, that it simply excises
from the First Amendment’s protection a narrow class of cases, rather
than fixing the limits of constitutional protection?
Before undertaking that analysis, it is worthwhile to consider
what “public concern” really means. Connick does not really define it,
except only to hold one part of Myers’s questionnaire as touching
252
upon it. One commentator notes that public concern or public in-

245

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
Cynthia K. Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment
on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1126 (1988).
247
Id.
248
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–49.
249
See, e.g., Lewis v. Harrison Sch. Dist., 805 F.2d 310, 313–17 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a high school principal’s criticism of a superintendent’s speech was
protected even though the matter involved a personnel dispute, where the matter
drew a large turnout at a board meeting, the attention of a local newspaper, and
spawned a petition signed by several teachers).
250
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
251
See Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted), rev’d, 543 U.S. 77 (2004); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1562 (10th
Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985).
252
Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
246
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terest may be viewed in either an objective or a subjective sense.
When viewed subjectively, the inquiry is whether or not the public is,
254
As an objective matter,
in actuality, concerned with the speech.
however, something may be a matter of public interest even if no one
255
is subjectively interested in it.
R. George Wright argued that the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence aims to protect speech that concerns
the “legitimacy of the political process,” speech that is popularly ac256
cepted, or speech that captures the attention of the media.
Viewed through this lens, it is quite difficult to argue that the
speech in Berger and Flanagan rose to matters of public concern under Connick. This Comment has explained why Connick’s public concern language was generally unnecessary to decide the case before
257
it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court specifically went out of its way
to erect a threshold requirement to move on to the Pickering balanc258
ing test. The court in Berger held only that Berger’s imitation of Al
Jolson in blackface constituted a matter of public concern because it
259
The Berger court’s logic is forceful
was not a workplace grievance.
insofar as it suggests that Connick should not be read to compel results that are not in harmony with the reasons underlying its decision.
Nonetheless, the Berger court’s decision also has the effect of writing
the public concern test out of existence; if anything that is not a
workplace personnel dispute or complaint is a matter of public concern, then public concern has been effectively drained of all mean260
ing.
The National Treasury Court arrived at its holding in virtually the
261
same way as the Berger court reached its decision. The Court in National Treasury made no effort to describe how the plaintiffs’ activities
rose to matters of public concern, instead focusing on how the plaintiffs’ activities were unlike those activities the Court chose not to pro262
tect in Connick. Once again, such a reading of Connick is unfaithful
253
See R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL
L. REV. 27, 34–35 (1987).
254
Id.
255
Id. at 35.
256
Id. at 35–36 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778
(1986)).
257
See supra Part IV.B.ii.
258
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–49 (1983).
259
Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998–99 (4th Cir. 1985).
260
See D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262–63 (1990) (“[T]he Fourth Circuit [in Berger] turned Connick on its head.”).
261
See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995).
262
Id.
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to Connick’s conception of public concern because it treats Connick as
having not mentioned the concept at all. Public concern is the
linchpin of Connick.
After Roe refined Connick’s conception of public concern, the
consequences of these two decisions are far reaching. It is unclear
how courts will apply Roe and National Treasury, but because Roe is the
Court’s latest pronouncement on the subject, National Treasury’s discussion of public concern may fall by the wayside. If National Treasury
did not apply in Roe, when would it ever apply? In National Treasury,
the Court should have conducted a public concern analysis before
reaching Pickering. The Connick/Roe public concern doctrine conflated the Connick/Pickering analyses by considering the harm to the
263
employer.
Implicit in the Roe Court’s treatment of National Treasury, then, is
264
that Pickering considerations also inform the analysis in Connick.
This is a doctrinal quagmire. The public concern analysis is supposed
to function as a threshold requirement to even reach Pickering. Perhaps the lesson to be gleaned from Roe is that speech that is so far beyond the conception of “newsworthiness” is entitled to no protection
at all. One wonders whether the Roe Court overruled sub silentio the
public concern holding of National Treasury and merely replaced it
with its “newsworthiness” standard. The overarching point is that the
Supreme Court did not explicitly cast aside National Treasury, which
265
reaches a far different conception of public concern than does Roe.
Due to the Supreme Court’s confounding treatment of the issue in
Roe, courts will likely struggle with the question of when National
Treasury applies.
If the Supreme Court in Roe chose not to protect Roe’s speech
because of its low First Amendment value, and Connick’s public concern requirement is most properly read as having teeth, then we are
left with a First Amendment that offers little protection to the free
speech rights of public employees when they speak outside the workplace on matters unrelated to their employment. Courts applying the
Connick analysis to speech that occurs outside the workplace that is
unrelated to work are writing the Pickering analysis out of existence.

263

See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (per curiam).
Id. at 82–85.
265
Compare Nat’l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 466 (speech addressed a public audience,
made outside the workplace, and largely not involving government employ entitled
to presumptive protection under Connick), with Roe, 543 U.S. at 84 (speech addressed
a public audience, made outside the workplace, and largely not involving government employ not entitled to protection under Connick).
264
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The very essence of Connick is that the government should not have
to justify an adverse employment decision when speech is not about a
266
matter of public concern. In formulating the public concern doc267
trine, however, the court launched a missile to kill a mouse. Since
the speech at issue does not occur at work, it is likely that the speech
is not about work. Because the speech is not about work, the Connick
Court’s concern of personnel disputes planting the seeds of constitutional cases diminishes greatly.
What remains is speech that would otherwise be entitled to full
protection in the absence of the employee’s government employment. What justifies the employee’s loss of her free speech rights,
then, is the notion that the speech may somehow harm the employer.
When viewed this way, Connick is simply a superfluous hurdle for
plaintiffs to jump. One may argue that by virtue of the governmental
employ, the employee should have to overcome certain hurdles and
the employer should enjoy wide latitude in curbing the speech of its
employees. But when the speech occurs outside of work, the public
concern test is like trying to put a square peg in a round hole because
the central concern of Connick is that internal personnel matters are
268
not protected by the First Amendment.
Connick’s concern is rendered irrelevant when the speech is unrelated to employment. There
is a doctrinal and policy-based solution to Connick which is more
speech protective and more doctrinally coherent than Connick.
V. A DOCTRINAL AND POLICY BASED SOLUTION: FLANAGAN AND
PROTECTED EXPRESSION
Connick, while having teeth, is also an albatross, and the court in
269
Flanagan treated it as such.
Where Berger strained to apply it,
270
Flanagan chose to ignore it.
The Flanagan approach is less fundamentally at odds with Connick than it first appears to be. Flanagan
held simply that Connick does not apply to speech that occurs outside
271
the workplace and is unrelated to the employee’s employment. In
light of Roe, do courts even have to apply Connick in these situations?
One commentator has argued that because the court in Rankin extended Connick to a comment unrelated to the employee’s employ266

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–49 (1983).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
268
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
269
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1562–65 (10th Cir. 1989).
270
Id.
271
Id. at 1564–65.
267
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272

ment, Connick still applies.
Connick and Rankin, however, do not
purport to address situations where the conduct does not occur at
273
One might argue instead that Roe overruled Flanagan bework.
274
cause Roe applied Connick to this type of fact pattern.
Roe did not
formulate a new principle of law, however, as much as it overturned
the Ninth Circuit’s decision because the conduct was not, in the Supreme Court’s view, a matter of public concern. Roe left open the
possibility that Connick does not apply away from the workplace because Roe only addressed the parties’ specific situation rather than the
broad doctrinal issue of whether Connick applies in these types of
275
cases.
The counterargument is, of course, that Roe implicitly held as
such by applying Connick. However, Roe did not set forth any new
principle of law. Roe merely redefined public concern and held that
276
Roe’s activities did not meet the threshold. Explicitly left open was
the possibility that Connick did not apply in cases like Roe because the
277
Supreme Court did not make such a holding. The Roe decision is
more properly viewed as correcting what the Court saw as a clearly er278
roneous decision from the Ninth Circuit.
This Comment proposes the abandonment of Connick where
employee speech occurs away from work and is unrelated to em279
ployment. Instead of Connick, a refined type of Flanagan test should
apply. The inquiry should be whether the employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment, and if it is, whether the speech invokes the specter of imminent harm such that the employer should
not have to justify its action under Pickering.
Under Flanagan, an employer would first ask whether the em280
ployee engaged in protected expression. If the answer is yes, then
the employer would necessarily have to weigh its interests in curbing
281
the speech at issue against punishing the employee who spoke.
This is, of course, no different than the decisions that government
employers currently make. The only difference is that, in the absence
272

See Smith, supra note 260, at 264.
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S 378, 384 (1987); Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
274
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam).
275
Id. at 84–85.
276
Id. at 84.
277
Id. at 82–85.
278
Id. at 84.
279
This Comment is not the first place that someone has proposed a partial abandonment of Connick. See Smith, supra note 260, at 262.
280
Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564–65 (10th Cir. 1989).
281
Id. at 1565–67.
273
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of actual harm, the employer will have to evaluate whether the harm
to its operation is imminent. Otherwise, the employer will have to
presume that the speech is protected unless the speech interferes
with the employer’s operation such that the employer would win un282
der Pickering. The result is that employers would not be able to inhibit employees’ speech outside of work unless their speech was imminently harmful, or unless the employer could actually show that the
speech hampered its operations. With the public concern test abandoned, all speech otherwise deserving of First Amendment protection
would be presumptively protected.
Employers would still have an “out” if they could show that harm
was imminent. To show how this would work as a matter of practice,
it is clear that in cases like Roe, Berger, and Flanagan an employer
would not be able to make the requisite showing. In Roe, the harm
alleged to befall the police department was grossly exaggerated by the
Supreme Court. If someone other than a member of the department
had actually identified Roe in one of his videos as an officer in the
department, it is possible that the reputation of the department
could have been harmed. However, it is entirely unclear why this
harm in the abstract should outweigh Roe’s right to engage in activity
that is otherwise protected, unless the department could show actual
harm under Pickering. The harm in Roe, nebulous at best, is far from
283
immediate. In Berger, the harm to the department was not immediate either. Indeed, Berger was only fired after the department had
284
suffered actual harm, and thus Pickering was the appropriate stan285
Finally, in
dard for the Berger court to apply to Berger’s speech.
Flanagan, it is unclear whether the plaintiffs’ sales of adult videotapes
286
harmed the department at all, much less presented the specter of
imminent harm when the department found out about their activities.
A case where the imminent harm test would likely be satisfied is
287
one with facts like Melzer v. Board of Education.
In Melzer, plaintiff
Paul Melzer was terminated from his position as a school teacher because of his membership in the North American Man/Boy Love As-

282

See Smith, supra note 260, at 269.
See Roe, 543 U.S. at 78–79.
284
See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1985).
285
Notwithstanding the Berger court’s misconstruction of Connick, see supra notes
259–60 and accompanying text, the court’s application of the Pickering standard was
proper.
286
See Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1560–61.
287
336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003).
283
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288

sociation. Melzer’s membership in the organization was eventually
289
discovered by the school and was widely reported in the media.
Melzer alleged that his termination violated his First Amendment
290
rights to free speech and association.
The school district argued
that the public airing of Melzer’s activities made it impossible for him
291
The court assumed that the
to effectively continue as a teacher.
public concern test was satisfied and struck the balance under
292
Pickering in favor of the school district, upholding his dismissal.
The school district could have made a showing that Melzer’s
continued employment at the school would result in imminent harm.
It is more likely than not that the school district would suffer harm
from the revelation of a public school teacher’s membership in a
group that openly advocates the abolition of age of consent and child
293
pornography laws. This is not to suggest that Melzer would neces294
sarily have harmed anybody. It is, instead, only to point out that the
possible harms that could have befallen the school were many, and the
disruption eventually caused by the revelation of Melzer’s member295
ship was entirely predictable.
In this unique circumstance, the
school district should not have had to show that its interests outweighed Melzer’s interests.
This is, indeed, the tradeoff in abandoning the public concern
test. Abandoning the test assures that other speech, while perhaps
not of the highest First Amendment value, will be presumptively protected, but gives government employers an out if they are inevitably
going to be harmed by the employee’s speech or by the continued
employment of the employee. Such a tradeoff will have the effect of
allowing more speech in, but also gives employers a tool to address
speech that will, unlike in Roe, actually harm them. The ultimate goal
of the test is to permit employees to do as they wish when they are not
at work, as long as the government remains unharmed.

288

Id. at 189–90.
Id. at 190–91.
290
Id. at 192.
291
Id.
292
Id. at 196–200.
293
Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189.
294
Indeed, there was no evidence that Melzer had broken any laws. Id. at 189.
295
The counterargument, mentioned in Melzer, is that such disruption effectively
amounts to a heckler’s veto on Melzer’s speech. Id. at 199. The very substance of
this area of law, however, assumes that the public employees’ speech is, in some instances, at the whim of the body politic. Otherwise courts would not engage in any
balancing at all.
289
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Roe, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify its
free speech jurisprudence as it relates to speech by public employees
that occurs outside of work and is unrelated to work. Instead, the
Court issued a confounding decision that will likely confuse the lower
courts. Courts will continue to struggle to apply the case law to this
category of speech until the Supreme Court addresses it directly. The
solution proposed in this Comment would leave courts in the position of applying the Pickering analysis to employee speech that occurs
outside the workplace without the added struggle of defining when
the speech is of public concern—a relatively useless inquiry for this
category of speech unless one envisions a world where the government employee is an ever-functioning arm of the State. Because a
person should not lose his autonomy by virtue of working for the
government, the Court should reject this vision, and offer this category of speech qualified First Amendment protection.

